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ABSTRACT: The paper studies the relationship between political violence and biological life 
in the thought of Hannah Arendt, Giorgio Agamben and Michel Foucault.  I follow Foucault in 
arguing that understanding political violence in modernity means rethinking the ontological 
boundary between biological and political life that has fundamentally ordered the Western 
tradition of political thought.  I show that while Arendt, Agamben and Foucault all see the 
merging of the categories of life and politics as the key problem of Modernity, they under-
stand this problem in crucially different terms and suggest different solutions to it.  This re-
sults in different understandings of the relationship between violence and the political.  It is 
my contention that the violence of modern biopolitical societies is not due to originary ties be-
tween sovereign power and biopower, as Agamben claims. Sovereign states use biopolitical 
methods of violence, but this violence is not an originary or necessary aspect of political 
power. In order to criticise the forms of violence specific to modern biopolitical societies we 
must expose the points of tension, as well as of overlap between two types of power – bio-
power and sovereign power. Understanding their distinctive rationalities is crucial for deve-
loping effective strategies against current forms of political violence. 
 
Keywords: violence, the political, biopower, biopolitics, sovereignty, life, Foucault, Arendt, 
Agamben.  
 
A. S. Byatt’s intriguing novella, Morpho Eugenia, tells the story of a young Victorian naturalist, 
William Adamson, whose objects of study are social insects and their highly specialised be-
haviour patterns.  The story follows his inner turmoil as he observes the ferocious violence of 
ant life and the disconcerting parallels between their stratified society and his own Victorian 
class society.  Yet, when he is questioned on what we might be learn from a comparison be-
tween human societies and those of social insects he is quick to insist that analogy is a slippery 
tool: ‛Men are not ants.‛  Nevertheless, the story raises haunting questions fundamental to 
Western political thought: Why are men not like ants?  Why is human political violence not 
just another deterministic struggle for survival in which individuals carry out their biologi-
cally predestined functions for the survival of the species, their individual lives dispensable 
and endlessly replaced? 
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The classical philosophical answer has been to insist on the specificity of the political.  
Ants might be social insects, but only man is a political animal.  Whereas human bodily exis-
tence and biological life are inextricably tied to the violent struggle for survival and the cycle 
of birth and death, the defining feature of Western tradition of political thought has been the 
separation of the political from the biological.  Aristotle famously connects the specificity of 
human politics to our ability to speak, arguing in the first book of Politics that human society is 
distinguished from that of ‚bees or other gregarious animals‛ in that it is founded on a poli-
tical community that is capable of speech.  Through language it is possible to express not 
simply what is pleasant and painful, but what is good and evil as well as just and unjust: ‚it is 
the peculiarity of man, in comparison with other animals, that he alone possesses a perception 
of good and evil, of the just and the unjust, and other similar qualities; and it is association in 
these things which makes a family and a city.‛1  Thus, according to the ancient conception, 
politics is not about the pure preservation and enhancement of natural life, but it makes it 
possible to live a life according to moral values and political principles.  Politics is the means 
of separating and placing in opposition human society to other animals, but also to its own 
biological existence.  
An influential strand of contemporary political thought claims that what characterises 
Modernity is the disappearance of the boundary that separates a political community from its 
biological existence.  Foucault famously presents biopolitical power, or biopower, as the 
overturning of the ancient categories of biological and political existence that have organised 
Western political thought: ‚For millennia, man remained what he was for Aristotle: a living 
animal with the additional capacity for a political existence; modern man is an animal whose 
politics places his existence as a living being into question.‛2  His claim is that modern politics 
does not exclude life, but takes it as its primary object: politics has become biopolitics. 
My aim in this paper is to follow Foucault and argue that understanding the 
relationship between violence and the political in Modernity means rethinking the ontological 
distinction between biological and political life that has fundamentally ordered the Western 
tradition of political thought.  I will begin with a brief discussion of Hannah Arendt’s and 
Giorgio Agamben’s positions, but my focus is on Foucault’s understanding of biopolitics.  I 
will show that whereas Arendt, Agamben and Foucault all see the merging of the categories of 
life and politics as the key problem of Modernity, they understand this problem in crucially 
different terms and suggest different solutions.  This results in different understandings of the 
relationship between violence and the political.  In conclusion I argue that it is vital to fully 
understand the governmental rationality of modern biopolitical societies in order to develop 
effective strategies against their specific forms of political violence. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Aristotle, Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 11. 
2 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol 1, An Introduction, trans. by Robert Hurley (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1978), 143. 
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Arendt and Instrumental Violence 
Hannah Arendt’s contested notion of ‚the social‛ has been understood in varying ways by her 
commentators and critics alike.3  On the one hand, she describes its rise in terms of de facto 
historical development connected to the birth of the modern bureaucratic state and consu-
merist mass society.4  The rise of the social was made possible by the birth of the nation-state 
in which it found its political form: politics became equated with the ‚nation-wide admini-
stration of housekeeping.‛5  Private matters and interests assumed public significance and eco-
nomic concerns became central issues of politics.  
The social also functions as an ontological concept, however.  It denotes a distorted 
domain in which the life process has been brought into the political realm.  The social is not 
strictly public or private, but is a hybrid realm in that it is concerned with the public admini-
stration of biological life: the life of the individual body and the propagation of the species.  
Arendt claims that in the social sphere man does not exist as a human being, but only as a 
specimen of the animal species mankind.  Modern society is like ant society: a society of la-
bourers and jobholders whose activities are centred around the maintenance and improve-
ment of life itself: ‚Society is the form in which the fact of mutual dependence for the sake of 
life and nothing else assumes public significance and where the activities connected with sheer 
survival are permitted to appear in public.‛6  The crisis of modern politics is due to the rise of 
the social: the fact that concern for biological life has taken over the public realm.  Modern 
society is not a properly political organisation, it is a public organisation of ‚the life process 
itself.‛7  Life itself has become the supreme standard and the highest good to which everything 
else is referred.  
In Arendt’s threefold schema of labour, work and action, labour is the activity that 
corresponds to the biological process of the human body—the satisfaction of its vital needs, its 
metabolisms and necessary consumption.  Labour is the activity that man shares with other 
forms of animal life because all life depends on it.  Her central claim in The Human Condition is 
that in the modern age, labour, and with it the maintenance of biological life, has become the 
most important activity: the whole of society has become a labouring society aiming solely at 
increased consumption, economic growth and material well-being.  We are not satisfied with 
securing the necessities of life in order to be free to engage in higher, specifically human 
                                                 
3 Her feminist critics have seen it as another expression of her masculinism and her hostile attitude to the 
feminine, private realm. Hanna Pitkin has compared it to a monstrous Blob that is gobbling up our freedom 
and politics.  See, Hanna Pitkin, ‚Conformism, Housekeeping, and the Attack of the Blob: The Origins of 
Hannah Arendt’s Concept of the Social,‛ in Bonnie Honig (ed.), Feminist Interpretations of Hannah Arendt 
(University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 53.  On the criticism of the distinction between 
social and political realms, see also e.g., Richard Bernstein, Philosophical Profiles: Essays in a Pragmatic Mode 
(Philadelphia: University of Pensylvania Press, 1986), 238-260. 
4 In The Human Condition Arendt expresses concern with the conformism and normalisation that modern so-
cieties impose through ‚innumerable and various rules, all of which tend to normalize its members, to make 
them behave, to exclude spontaneous action or outstanding achievement.‛ Hannah Arendt, The Human 
Condition (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1998), 40. 
5 Ibid., 28. 
6 Ibid., 46. 
7 Ibid. 
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pursuits.  Freedom from need does not mean that we have more free time for other things than 
consumption, the satisfying of increasingly sophisticated and complex appetites.  ‚Our whole 
economy has become a waste economy, in which things must be almost as quickly devoured 
and discarded as they have appeared in the world.‛8  The exclusive emphasis on labour in mo-
dernity means that an authentically human way of life devoted to politics, action and speech is 
not possible for us.  
Arendt repeatedly insists that in ancient Greece the sphere of politics, polis, excluded 
from its sphere of public concern the biological necessities of life, which were confined to the 
private sphere of the household, oikos.  The distinction was essential not just for maintaining 
the distinctiveness of the political as a sphere of public deliberation and speech, but also, by 
negation, for excluding the inevitable violence of biological life.9  The distinctive trait of the 
household sphere was that it was ruled by necessity.  Men lived together in a household, just 
as ants lived together, in order to master the necessities of life and survive as individuals and 
as a species.  Violence was justified and inescapable in this sphere, but it was prepolitical, as 
opposed to political, violence.  The realm of the polis, on the contrary, was the sphere of free-
dom untainted by the necessities of life: language and not violence belonged essentially to 
politics.  She notes that ‚the Greek polis, the city-state, defined itself explicitly as a way of life 
that was based exclusively upon persuasion and not upon violence.‛10  
 
To be political, to live in a polis, meant that everything was decided through words and per-
suasion and not through force and violence.  In Greek self-understanding, to force people by 
violence, to command rather than persuade, were prepolitical ways to deal with people cha-
racteristic of life outside of polis, of home and family life.11 
 
Arendt’s carefully qualified understanding of the political thus cuts any deterministic tie po-
litics might be thought to have to violence.  It opens up the realm of specifically human com-
munality, the political: the realm of freedom, spontaneity and creativity as opposed to the 
realm of necessity, violence and survival.  She carefully safeguards the political as a realm of 
non-violence, speech and action by cutting it loose from the body and from biological life.  
In her thought, the unprecedented violence of modernity can therefore be seen as anot-
her consequence of the dominance of the social over the political: the violence intrinsic to sur-
vival comes to dominate the sphere of the political in different forms.  She argues that every 
attempt to solve the social question by political means has inevitably led to terror.12  The 
French Revolution is her paradigmatic example.  In On Revolution she famously attributes its 
failure to found a stable political regime, as well as the horrendous violence that accompanied 
it, to the fact that ‚the poor, driven by the needs of their bodies, burst onto the scene of the 
French Revolution.‛13 
                                                 
8 Ibid., 134. 
9 See e.g., ibid., 26, 31, 129. 
10 Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990), 12. 
11 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, 27. 
12 Hannah Arendt, On Revolution, 112. 
13 Ibid., 59. 
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Poverty is more than deprivation, it is a state of constant want and acute misery whose 
ignominy consists in its dehumanizing force; poverty is abject because it puts men under the 
absolute dictate of their bodies, that is, under the absolute dictatorship of necessity as all 
men know from their most intimate experience and outside of all speculations.  It was under 
the rule of this necessity that the multitude rushed to the assistance of the French 
Revolution, inspired it, drove it onward, and eventually sent it to its doom, for this was the 
multitude of the poor.  When they appeared on the scene of politics, necessity appeared 
with them, and the result was that the new republic was still born; freedom has to be sur-
rendered to necessity, to the urgency of the life process itself.14 
 
When the hungry mob appeared as the revolutionary agent, the political ideals of freedom and 
democratic rule had to be compromised.  The political demands of the people were made on 
behalf of sheer survival and their decisions were determined by the overwhelming needs of 
their bodies.  The objective of the revolution was no longer to liberate men from oppression or 
to found freedom; the primary aim was now to rid the life process of scarcity and to guarantee 
the satisfaction of the needs and happiness of the people. 
Arendt notes that what she refers to as ‚the social question‛ could therefore equally 
well and more simply be called the existence of poverty.  For her, it is the source of ‚the 
politically most pernicious doctrine of the modern age, namely that life is the highest good, 
and that the life process of society is the very centre of human endeavour.‛15  Politics, in the 
true sense of the word, becomes possible only when the irresistible needs of the body are 
satisfied.  The promise of a revolution, an absolutely new beginning, cannot be fulfilled by the 
violent acts of hungry bodies, but requires concerted action of citizens.  It requires their 
common deliberation on a set of shared principles, as well as the pledging of mutual promises 
that binds them together.  Revolutions will inevitably fail to constitute political power as long 
as they identify it simply with the monopoly of the means of violence.  Political power can 
only come into being when and where people act together and ‚bind themselves through 
promises, covenants, and mutual pledges.‛16  In other words, political power rests only on 
deliberation, reciprocity and mutuality—not on violence. 
The distinction between the social and the political thus closely parallels Arendt’s 
distinction between violence and power.  In her late essay On Violence, she explicates the cate-
gorical distinction between power and violence, vehemently arguing against what she claims 
was the consensus among political theorists from Left to Right at the time that violence was 
nothing more than the ultimate kind of power.17  Her pamphlet was directed at its apologists, 
such as Sartre and Fanon, whom she saw as glorifying violence by treating it as a positive, 
liberating action.  She argues that whereas power—the concerted action of a group—forms the 
essence of all government, violence is always instrumental.  It is undeniably part of politics 
                                                 
14 Ibid., 60. 
15 Ibid., 64. 
16 Ibid., 181. 
17 The distinction between violence, force and power is already touched upon in The Human Condition, but 
elaborated further in the later essay On Violence.  See Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, 202. See also, 
e.g., Hannah Arendt, On Revolution, 179-181. 
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because it can be used as a means of pursuing various political goals and causes but, crucially, 
it is ontologically apolitical.  As a mere means it always needs justification through the politi-
cal end or cause that it espouses.  On its own violence remains apolitical: it lacks direction and 
inherent meaning.  
The reason why violence is understood as a political question at all is because it is so 
often fused with power, even though by its very nature it is fundamentally antithetical to 
power.  Under threat of violence, the capacity to realise the human possibility of acting in con-
cert is diminished and potentially destroyed.  ‚Power and violence are opposites; where one 
rules absolutely, the other is absent.  Violence appears where power is in jeopardy, but left to 
its own course it ends in power’s disappearance.‛18  Violence can destroy power and politics, 
but it can never produce them.19 
To sum up this section, Arendt’s key concern was to redeem the intrinsic value of the 
political.  Politics should not be reduced to an instrumental means to the apolitical ends of 
natural life: survival, pleasure and happiness.  It has to remain an end in itself and therefore to 
retain its specificity as public action and speech.  The distinction between the social and what 
is truly political is thus fundamental for her philosophical response to the crisis and decline of 
the public realm of politics in modern societies.  It is a resurrection of the ancient answer to the 
question of why men are not ants.  The restoration of the ancient distinction between polis and 
oikos could restore not only the specificity but also the dignity of politics, and by the same 
token separate it from the realm of biological life and inescapable violence.  Arendt’s under-
standing of the political thus provides an agonistic account of political action that is neverthe-
less irreducible to violence.  This fortification of the political does not imply the strengthening 
of the state, but rather heralds the revitalisation of public life, political debate and partici-
pation.  
The price we pay is the radical narrowing of the realm of the political, however.  All 
issues belonging to the social—such as poverty, sexuality and gender—are economic, biolo-
gical or technological questions rather than appropriately political questions.  Political and so-
cial equality must remain distinct issues.  As her critics have pointed out, in protecting the sui 
generis character of her politics and the purity of the public realm, Arendt effectively prohibits 
the politicisation of issues of social justice.20  While alerting us to the dangerous merging of life 
and politics in Modernity she would nevertheless insist that biopolitics must remain an oxy-
moron, the merging of two ontologically incompatible concepts. 
                                                 
18 Hannah Arendt, On Violence (San Diego: Harcourt Brace, 1970), 56. 
19 James Dodd argues that Arendt’s instrumental account of violence appears more complex if her separation 
of labour and work in The Human Condition is understood as leading to the idea that the order of instru-
mentality characterising work is a kind of violence.  She describes the emergence of the sphere of human 
works as a form of constitutive violence: the world of instruments, of produced and built things, represents a 
violent breaking free from the monotony and impermanence of the incessant metabolism with nature that is 
embodied in labour.  The world, understood as more than nature, can thus be understood to be born of ori-
ginary violence against the giveness of nature.  James Dodd, Violence and Phenomenology (New York and Lon-
don: Routledge, 2009), 58-60. 
20 Bonnie Honig, ‚Toward an Agonistic Feminism: Hannah Arendt and the Politics of Identity,‛ in Bonnie 
Honig (ed.), Feminist Interpretations of Hannah Arendt, 135. 
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Agamben and the Originary Violence of Sovereignty 
In their respective analyses of biopower, both Foucault and Agamben follow Arendt in main-
taining that the political realm in Modernity has become more and more preoccupied with the 
management of biological life.  They both deny that we should or could restore the classical 
political categories, as proposed by Arendt, however.  This denial brings violence back to the 
heart of politics, but in fundamentally different ways.  Whereas Foucault considers the birth of 
biopower a contingent historical fact, which he dates to the second half of the eighteenth cen-
tury, Agamben sees it is as an originary phenomenon contemporaneous with the entire history 
of Western metaphysics.  
Agamben’s analysis of the relationship between political power and biological life in 
his influential book Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, builds on some of the key ideas 
of Arendt and Foucault, but the way he appropriates them for his own theory is highly 
original and challenging.  He begins by confirming Arendt’s claim that ‚Today politics knows 
no value< other than life.‛21  The politicisation of life as such constitutes a decisive event of 
modernity and signals a radical transformation of the political and philosophical categories of 
Ancient thought.  He breaks sharply with Arendt, however, in denying that the distinction 
between biological and political life has, ever since its very inception, held fast.  Life has al-
ways been a definitive object of politics.  The explicit preoccupation with life in modern poli-
tics only brings to light the way in which politics has always been founded on power over 
natural life.  In taking biological life as its primary target, the modern state only exposes the 
hidden but originary bond between sovereign power and bare life. 
Agamben acknowledges that politics was, since the time of Aristotle, explicitly 
separated from natural life.  The Ancient distinction between zoe and bios, natural life and 
political life, grounded the idea that politics was concerned with something more than just the 
perpetuation of biological life.  It was fundamentally defined by such specifically human cha-
racteristics as justice, morality, language and self-reflexivity.  According to Agamben, the dis-
tinction between bare life and political life was always an unstable distinction, however: a 
distinction that could never be fully maintained nor eliminated.  The exclusion of bare life out-
side of the political has to be understood to be at the same time an inclusion in being a 
founding act: it is the very act that establishes the community as political.  He calls this inclu-
sive exclusion a relation of exception: it is the extreme form of relation by which something is 
included solely through its exclusion.22   
 
There is politics because man is the living being who, in language separates and opposes 
himself to his own bare life and, at the same time, maintains himself in relation to that bare 
life in an inclusive exclusion.23   
 
Bare life, through its exclusion, is the hidden foundation of politics.  It is what political, pro-
perly human life is not, and politics must therefore repeatedly enact its exclusion. 
                                                 
21 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 10. 
22 Ibid., 18. 
23 Ibid., 8. 
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This means that Agamben’s concept of bare life does not simply denote biological, 
animal life.  While he sometimes uses the term as a synonym for biological life as opposed to 
political life, bare life is strictly neither natural nor political life, neither the public life of a 
citizen nor the natural life of an animal.  Agamben’s examples of it include: detainees of refu-
gee camps, brain dead patients in hospital wards and inmates in death row.  In these exem-
plary sites, human life is in different ways reduced to bare life, to the simple fact of living 
common to all living beings.  Bare life is thus something that cannot be clearly demarcated and 
then simply negated.24  It is biological life that has been politicised in being included in the 
political community, but only through its exclusion.  
The idea of exception is also central for Agamben’s conception of sovereignty, which is 
decisively Schmittian: the sovereign is the one who decides on the state of exception.25  Schmitt 
argued that any legal system had to rest upon a decision that could not itself take the form of 
law.  This holds true to both its limits as well as its origin: the judicial system requires a 
political decision to give it limits as well as a set of fundamental principles and values.  The 
sovereign must have the power to set these limits and thereby provide the ungrounded 
ground of the law.  He must have the power to decide when the normally valid legal system 
operates and when its validity is suspended in a state of exception.  In establishing the thres-
hold between the legal and the non-legal he defines them both.  Similar to the way that the 
exclusion of bare life founds the realm of the political, the exclusion of sovereignty from the 
realm of the law founds the legal order.  The state of exception is not anarchy or chaos because 
an order still exists, even if it is not the order dictated by laws.  The exception is outside the 
law, but it thereby defines its limits and creates the normal situation in which the law can be in 
force.26 
                                                 
24 Catherine Mills argues similarly in her seminal book on Agamben that the notion of bare or naked life 
(nuda vida) has given rise to a great deal of misunderstanding in literature on Homo Sacer.  While Agamben 
often appears to use the term simply as a synonym for natural or biological life (zoe), she shows that his aim 
is in fact to question the distinction between bios and zoe.  Bare life is neither natural nor political life because 
it is the politicised form of natural life.  See, Catherine Mills, The Philosophy of Agamben (Stocksfield: Acumen, 
2008), 64, 69.  Other commentators also note that the concept is never precisely defined.  See e.g., Andrew 
Norris, ‚The Exemplary Exception: Philosophical and Political Decisions in Giorgio Agamben’s Homo Sacer,‛ 
in Andrew Norris (ed.), Politics, Metaphysics, and Death. Essays on Giorgio Agamben’s Homo Sacer (Durham and 
London: Duke University Press, 2005), 270.  Peter Fitzpatrick, ‚Bare Sovereignty: Homo Sacer and the Insis-
tence of Law,‛ in Andrew Norris (ed.), Politics, Metaphysics, and Death, 65. 
25 Carl Schmitt presents his influential theory of sovereignty in Constitutional Theory and the first volume of 
Political Theology.  See Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2006).  Carl Schmitt, Constitutional Theory (Durham and London: Duke Univer-
sity Press, 2008). 
26 See Giorgio Agamben ‚The State of Exception,‛ in Andrew Norris (ed.), Politics, Metaphysics, and Death, 
289.  Peter Fitzpatrick argues that Agamben moves markedly beyond the conception of sovereignty extrac-
ted from Schmitt because for Schmitt the sovereign was still a juridical entity.  For Schmitt the sovereign 
decision cannot be simply beyond the normal order and preformed law, but is also imbued with law.  If 
sovereign claims are to be any more than evanescent and assume operative continuance, they must be 
integrally tied to law.  Law constitutes the decision maker himself and constitutes the matters decided upon.  
Exception must be distinguishable from juristic chaos and therefore it is the legal system itself, which can 
anticipate the exception and suspend itself.  Although the sovereign stands outside the normally valid legal 
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Sovereignty, understood in this way, thus corresponds crucially to bare life.  Bare life is 
the exception within the political order because it forms the zone outside of the law and of po-
litical rights.  The exclusion of bare life from the realm of politics establishes sovereign power 
as the power that decides on that exception: bare life is the essential referent of the sovereign 
decision.  In other words, the exclusion of bare life as the exception forms the condition of 
possibility of politics, and also of sovereignty.  The state of exception excludes bare life from 
the political community, but by the same token also captures it within it as the exception.  It is 
the permanent state of exception that constitutes the hidden foundation on which the entire 
political system rests.27  For Agamben, the defining feature of political power in the West is 
precisely its ability to suspend the law, and by the same act, to produce a sphere of bare life: 
beings without political rights or properly human qualities.  
Because the exclusion of bare life forms the foundation of sovereignty, and sovereignty 
in turn produces bare life, the necessary counterpart of the sovereign in Agamben’s thought is 
homo sacer—an ancient figure in Roman law who was without any political rights and who 
could be killed by anybody without fear of any legal punishment.  Similar to homo sacer, the 
sovereign must be outside the law, he must necessarily stand outside the legal system in order 
to be able to decide on its suspension.  He is excluded from the political realm in the same 
sense that homo sacer is excluded from it, and this constitutes their hidden and originary bond.  
The sovereign is one who can kill without legal punishment—he is the point of indistinction 
between violence and the law—and homo sacer is one who can be killed without legal 
punishment.  They both are within and without the legal order:  
 
At the two extreme limits of the order, the sovereign and homo sacer present two sym-
metrical figures that have the same structure and are correlative: the sovereign is the one 
with respect to whom all men are potentially homines sacri, and homo sacer is the one with 
respect to whom all men act as sovereigns.28 
 
Bare life and political power, homo sacer and the sovereign are ‚the two poles of the sovereign 
exception‛ irrevocably tied together.29  Homo sacer represents the bare life that must be ex-
cluded and negated in order for the political community to become more than an ant society.  
Andrew Norris explicates the importance of the figure of homo sacer in Agamben’s account by 
comparing it to René Girard’s superficially similar account of sacrifice.  Whereas for Girard the 
victim is a scapegoat for the murderous desires of the community, for Agamben the stakes are 
considerably higher.  Instead of an act of self-protection on the part of the community, the 
killing of sacred life is the performance of the metaphysical assertion of the human: homo sacer 
                                                                                                                                                                  
system, he nevertheless belongs to it, and sovereignty remains a juristic concept.  In other words, sove-
reignty could not be sovereign without the law.  The law and sovereignty depend on each other in a way 
that means that the law cannot simply be subordinated to sovereignty instrumentally.  See Peter Fitzpatrick, 
‚Bare Sovereignty: Homo Sacer and the Insistence of Law,‛ in Andrew Norris (ed.), Politics, Metaphysics, and 
Death, 58-60. 
27 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer, 15-29. 
28 Ibid., 84. 
29 Ibid., 110. 
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must die so that the rest of the political community may affirm the transcendence of their 
bodily, animal life.30 
Agamben’s account also significantly relies on Foucault’s concept of biopower, but the 
way he appropriates this idea is different.  Foucault’s analysis of biopower in the final section 
of The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1 is short and fragmentary, but the key distinction that he 
makes is between sovereign power, or juridico-institutional power and biopower.  Whereas 
classical sovereign power was essentially repressive and deductive, biopower has a funda-
mentally different rationality.  Its purpose is to exert a positive and productive influence on 
life, to optimise and to multiply it.  It is an important tool in Foucault’s attempt to rethink 
power: to find ways in which to theorise it that are not caught up in the narrow juridico-
institutional framework of sovereignty that has dominated Western political thought.   
Although Agamben shares with Foucault the view that modern Western societies are 
biopolitical, he challenges the idea that this is a historically recent development: ‚Biopolitics is 
at least as old as the sovereign exception.‛31  More fundamentally, he also denies that the two 
forms of power can be theoretically distinguished.  Foucault’s key distinction between bio-
power and sovereign power is, in fact, a false one because these two forms of power essen-
tially intersect and depend on each other. They are intrinsically and originally tied together: 
 
The present inquiry concerns precisely this hidden point of intersection between the juri-
dico-institutional and the biopolitical models of power.  What this work has had to record 
among its likely conclusions is precisely that the two analyses cannot be separated, and that 
the inclusion of bare life in the political realm constitutes the original – if concealed – 
nucleus of sovereign power.32 
 
Agamben argues that Foucault’s thesis about biopolitics has to be corrected: what charac-
terises modern politics in not the inclusion of life—the fact that life as such has become the 
principle object of the projections and calculations of State power.  The decisive fact is rather 
that the realm of bare life—which was originally situated at the margins of the political 
order—gradually begins to coincide with the political realm, and inclusion and exclusion, out-
side and inside, enter into a zone of irreducible indistinction.  Bare life used to be exceptional 
and excluded from public life, but in Modernity it has become coextensive with the political 
realm as a whole.  The boundary between bios and zoe that was always indeterminate and 
blurry has now been completely eliminated and they are no longer distinguishable from each 
other at all. 
Agamben’s provocative claim is that the rise of this zone of indistinction in modern 
societies means that the state of exception has gradually become more and more the norm: the 
exception has become the rule.  He argues that the obfuscation of the distinction among 
legislative, executive and judicial powers became a working paradigm of government in 
Western democracies in the course of the twentieth century.  Although the state of exception 
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was initially meant to be a provisional measure, it has in fact become a lasting characteristic of 
government.  This transformation of an exceptional measure into a permanent technique of 
government has resulted in the gradual erosion of the legislative power of parliament: it is 
often limited to ratifying measures that the executive issues through administrative decrees 
that have the force of law.33  ‚The state of exception< ceases to be referred to as an external 
and provisional state of factual danger and comes to be confused with juridical rule itself.‛34 
As a result, ‚exclusion and inclusion, outside and inside, bios and zoe, right and fact, enter a 
zone of irreducible indistinction.‛35  
Sovereignty thus produces bare life by establishing a state of exception with no tem-
poral limits.  We are all living in this state of exception, in a zone in which our life is subjected 
to the unmediated power of various police sovereigns and managers of life.  We are all 
effectively reduced to the status of homo sacer.  As citizens of modern democracies we are 
obviously not excluded from the political realm or the legal system as such, but when the state 
of exception becomes the norm or the rule the legal order operates only by suspending itself.  
In the state of exception the suspension of the law has become the rule and the law is ‚in force 
without significance.‛36  The law is not absent—we do not live in a lawless state—but it is 
emptied of concrete meaning and suspended in its effective application.  In this situation sove-
reign power becomes unmediated power over those whose existence is reduced to bare life.  
Politics has been ‚totally transformed into biopolitics‛37 when it is impossible to distinguish 
our biological life from our political existence anymore and when the resulting bare life can be 
destroyed by sovereign power at any moment. 
Hence, although the biopolitical logic of modernity places the highest value on life, it 
also, paradoxically, contains the exceptional power to take it away in an arbitrary fashion.  It 
produces human beings that are reduced to bare life without any political protection.  Agam-
ben sees the concentration camp as the paradigm of this political predicament of modernity: it 
is the exemplary biopolitical space in which politics has been completely transformed into 
biopolitics and bare life has been subjected absolutely to sovereign power.  The camps were 
opened when the state of exception had become the rule in Nazi Germany.  He notes that ‚the 
Jews were exterminated exactly as Hitler had announced, ‘as lice’, which is to say, as bare 
life.‛38  The dimension in which the extermination took place was neither religious nor legal, 
but biopolitical.  Because the people sent to the camps were lacking almost all the rights that 
are normally attributed to humane existence, and yet they were biologically alive, they came 
to be situated in a limit-zone in which they no longer had anything but bare life.  They moved 
in ‚a zone of indistinction between outside and inside, exception and rule, licit and illicit, in 
which the very concepts of subjective right and juridical protection no longer made any 
sense.‛39  The concentration camp was the most absolute biopolitical space that had ever been 
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realised: it was a space in which life was reduced to the bare minimum and sovereign power 
reached its maximum.  It is therefore the exemplary place of modern biopolitics, ‚the hidden 
paradigm of the political space of modernity.‛40 
Agamben regrets that both Arendt and Foucault overlooked this crucial site.  Arendt’s 
mistake in her pertinent analysis of the totalitarian states of the postwar period was to omit 
any biopolitical perspective.  What escaped her was the way in which the radical transfor-
mation of politics into biopolitics had legitimated and necessitated total domination.  Foucault, 
on the other hand, missed the most glaring manifestation of biopower that confronted him.  
His error was to overlook the most exemplary place of modern biopolitics, the politics of the 
great totalitarian states.  In other words, contemporary political thought has failed to situate 
the totalitarian phenomenon in the horizon of biopolitics and therefore ultimately to make 
sense of it.41  Agamben’s provocative claim is that until this is done Nazism and fascism will 
remain with us.  The camp is not just a historical fact and an anomaly belonging to the past; it 
is the hidden matrix of the political space in which we are still living.42 
For many readers, this emblem of the camp has come to stand in for Agamben’s 
complex account of biopolitics.  It has fuelled a lot criticism against him: he has been accused 
of constructing politically debilitating metaphysical fictions and morbid intellectual pontifi-
cations.  Michel Dillon argues that he ontologises political modernity and then ‚iconicises‛ 
this ontologisation in the compelling, but politically debilitating figure of the camp.43  Andreas 
Kalyvas observes that he ‚gives us no explanation for the sovereign’s repeated victories and 
unstoppable march toward the camp.‛44  His commentators have also pointed out that his 
understanding of bare life is theoretically ambiguous and his notion of sovereignty distur-
bingly ahistorical: the originary bond between bare life and sovereign power not only survives 
Antiquity, but extends unchanged over a period of twenty-five centuries right through to the 
Modern age.  Sovereign biopolitics has uninterruptedly accompanied the ancients and mo-
derns alike, remaining unaffected by significant political events, such as the birth of the An-
cient Greek democratic city or the emergence of commercial capitalism.  Agamben thus 
operates with a conception of history that does not bring forth anything new, but is uniform 
and unidirectional.45  
It is important to note that Agamben’s claims about politics are precisely ontological 
and not ontic, or that they are concerned with the history of metaphysics, not political history.  
For him, metaphysics is the pivotal political question of our time.  The radicality of his project 
lies in the attempt to fundamentally disturb the metaphysical categories that he claims are 
upholding our conception of the political: bare life/political existence, zoe/bios, exclusion/ 
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inclusion.  He shows how the construction, blurring and finally eradication of the distinction 
between biological life and political life has determined the political destiny of the West.  
Instead of defining the political through a focus on life that is recognised as just and good—the 
form of life proper to human community—he focuses on the other side of this fundamental 
dichotomy: on bare life, the forms of life that in one way or another fail to achieve what is 
understood as truly human life.  He wants to show that our conception of the political is not 
constituted solely by the idea of a community inclusive of beings capable of morality, self-
reflexivity and speech, but by the exclusion of life that is unworthy of politics.  Sovereign de-
cision is the moment of this fundamental and constitutive separation and exclusion.  Sove-
reignty can therefore not be thought of as a historically specific political formation contem-
poraneous with modern nation states.  It has to belong essentially and originally to our under-
standing of the political. 
In sum, Agamben’s answer to the question of the relationship between violence and the 
political is to acknowledge the irreducibility of sovereign violence over bare life.  In relation to 
the sovereign we are all ants.  The political has inevitably been founded on violence since its 
inception because of the fundamental bond between sovereignty and bare life.  This is an 
originary political bond or structure, which implies that political power, at least in the forms 
we know in the West, is inseparable from violence because it cannot be separated from the 
sovereign’s originary power to kill.  Arendt’s attempt to resurrect the Ancient meaning of the 
political as defined by speech and not violence is a doomed attempt because it was never in 
fact achieved.  The way of life in the Greek polis was not based on the eradication of violence, it 
was founded on the exclusion and killing of bare life.  This inclusive exclusion founded the 
political community and sovereign power.  The first foundation of politics is thus life that may 
be taken away, a body that can be killed.  Life is politicised irrevocably through its capacity to 
be destroyed by the sovereign.   
This means that, for Agamben, we cannot sever the originary bond between violence 
and the political by any nostalgic restoration of Ancient metaphysics.  The loss of politics is 
not a modern problem, but happens already in the Ancient polis where zoe and bios were 
originally separated.  The only genuine possibility for breaking this essential bond would re-
quire a move beyond the metaphysical categories of bare life and political life to a sovereign- 
less political community.  This coming community would not be based on national or religious 
identity, stable juridical or parliamentary institutions or political rights.  It is a utopian, mes-
sianic idea of a community.46 
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Foucault on Sovereignty and Biopower 
If Agamben has been criticised for operating with an ahistorical notion of sovereignty, Fou-
cault has been accused of eradicating the notion completely and replacing it with distinctively 
modern forms of power, such as discipline and biopower.  While it is true that he never deve-
loped any kind of explicit theory of sovereignty, the notion is nevertheless indirectly theorised 
as the consistent contrast to his alternative conceptualisations of power.  In Discipline and Pu-
nish, sovereign power forms the contrast to discipline and in The History of Sexuality, the 
central distinction organising the argument is between biopower and sovereignty.  In his lec-
tures on governmentality, mechanisms of security are introduced as an alternative to both dis-
cipline and sovereignty.  Rather than replacing sovereignty with these alternative forms of 
power, it is my contention that Foucault was working towards a more historically and poli-
tically grounded conception of it.  He thus contests traditional approaches to theorising 
political power based solely on juridical and institutional models, and advocates a radical 
rethinking in order to understand its historical changes and specific forms in modernity.  His 
idea was that sovereignty had to be analysed as a power formation that had undergone 
fundamental transformations in Western political history.  It has been challenged, modified 
and undermined by competing counter-discourses and new techniques of power. 
In his lectures on governmentality, he argues that the form of power that had 
sovereignty as its modality or organising schema was not up to governing the economic and 
political body of a society that was undergoing both a demographic explosion and industri-
alisation at the turn of the nineteenth century.  Too much escaped the old mechanisms of 
sovereign power, on both the detailed and the mass level.  There was an acute need for new 
power technologies focusing on individual bodies as well as on the species body.  Sovereign 
power was not comprehensive or flexible enough to respond effectively to new capital for-
mations and demographic changes.   
Foucault explicitly notes, however, that charting the genealogy of modern forms of 
power such as biopower is not a simple case of substitution.  Mechanisms of biopolitical 
governmentality did not simply replace juridico-institutional mechanisms.  The old sovereign 
right to take life or let live was not replaced, but was rather complemented with a new right to 
make live and let die.47  He attempted to identify a turning point in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries when the management of population took pre-eminence without repla-
cing sovereignty and law.  These two forms of power thus permeate each other and exist to-
gether forming a ‚scientifico-legal complex.‛48  This co-existence is not necessary or originary, 
however, as Agamben claims;  for Foucault, it is historically contingent.   
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Foucault’s short but influential discussion of biopower at the end of The History of 
Sexuality, Vol. 1, begins with a summary definition of sovereign power: it is a form of power 
that was historically founded on violence—the right to kill.  Its characteristic privilege, since 
Roman law, was the right to decide life and death.  In its limited modern form, as in its ancient 
and absolute form, it is dissymmetrical: the sovereign exercises his right of life only by exer-
cising his right to kill or by refraining from killing.  In other words, he demonstrates his power 
over life through the death he is capable of requiring.  Sovereign power was exercised mainly 
by means of deduction: it consisted of the right to appropriate a portion of the nation’s wealth, 
a tax on products, goods and services, time, bodies and ultimately, life itself.  It culminated in 
the privilege to seize hold of life in order to suppress it.49  The obligation to wage war on be-
half of the sovereign and the imposition of the death penalty for going against his will were 
the clearest forms of such power.   
Foucault’s claim is that the West has undergone a very profound transformation of the 
mechanisms of power since the seventeenth century.  Deductive and violent sovereign power 
has been gradually complemented and partly replaced by biopower, a form of power that 
exerts a positive influence on life, ‚that endeavours to administer, optimize, and multiply it, 
subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations.‛50  Deduction or violence is no 
longer the predominant form of power, but is merely one element among others, working 
towards a new objective under a new rationality.  Biopower is bent on generating and or-
dering forces: the aim is to increase them rather than to impede or destroy them.  In short, its 
logic or rationality is not violent deduction, but positive production.   
The era of biopolitics is marked by the explosion of numerous and diverse techniques 
for achieving the subjugation of bodies and control of populations: techniques that coordinate 
medical care, normalise behaviour, rationalise mechanisms of insurance and rethink urban 
planning, for example.  The aim is the effective administration of bodies and the calculated 
management of life through means that are scientific and continuous.  It is power whose 
highest function is no longer to kill but to ‚invest life through and through.‛51  What essen-
tially characterises biopower in Foucault’s account is thus not the fact that it is unmediated 
power over bare life, but the fact that the mechanisms of power and knowledge have assumed 
responsibility for the life process in order to optimise, control and modify it.  In other words, 
the exercise of power over living beings no longer carries the threat of death, but implies the 
taking charge of their life.  Life and its mechanisms are brought into the realm of explicit cal-
culation in the regimes of knowledge-power.  
The rationality of biopower is markedly different from that of sovereign power in 
terms not just of its objectives but also of its instruments.  A major consequence of its develop-
ment is the growing importance of the norm at the expense of the juridical system of the law.  
The law is always armed and is based on violence, whereas biopower takes charge of life with 
the help of continuous regulatory and corrective mechanisms based on knowledge.  Foucault 
argues that the rise of biopower means that we have entered a phase of juridical regression:  
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I do not mean to say that the law fades into the background or that the institutions of justice 
tend to disappear, but rather that the law operates more and more as a norm, and that the 
judicial institution is increasingly incorporated into the a continuum of apparatuses (medical 
and administrative, and so on) whose functions are for the most part regulatory.  A norma-
lizing society is the historical outcome of a technology of power centred on life.52  
 
According to Foucault, biopower uses administrative policies, strategies and tactics instead of 
laws as its instrument, or it uses laws as a tactic.  Biopolitical rationality treats the law as one 
administrative technique among others that can be utilised to regulate and improve the life of 
the population.  Biopolitical techniques do not typically result from sovereign parliamentary 
decisions, but are part of the administrative and managerial procedures legitimised by expert 
knowledge.  
Both Agamben and Foucault thus claim that we live in a society in which the power of 
the law has subsided.  Whereas Agamben sees this as a result of the sovereign state of excep-
tion that has become the norm, Foucault claims that it is the power of sovereignty itself that 
has been undermined.  Biopower is not political power in the traditional sense because it is not 
reducible to the power of a democratically elected sovereign body, whether individual or 
collective.  It penetrates such political power, but it is essentially the power of life’s experts, in-
terpreters and administrators.  The key problem with biopower is thus not the foundational 
violence of the sovereign, but the depoliticised violence of expert knowledge.  
Because Agamben connects sovereignty and biopower with an originary bond, his 
framework makes it difficult to diagnose the profound tensions that exist in modern societies 
between these two fundamentally different rationalities and types of power.  Whereas the 
essential feature of sovereign power is its license to kill, for biopower killing presents a 
problem: it does not celebrate death and violence, but seeks to exclude or at least to hide them.  
Foucault notes that death has ceased to be a collective and spectacular ceremony in modern 
biopolitical society, but has become something to be hidden away: it is ‚not so much sex as 
death that is the object of a taboo.‛53  
This obviously does not mean that modern biopolitical societies are non-violent.  On 
the contrary, violence is harder to detect because it has to be hidden.  Foucault readily ac-
knowledges the unprecedented violence of modernity: the biological conception of politics has 
made killing possible on an unprecedented scale.54  Biopower is thus clearly capable of utili-
sing violence, but only under very specific conditions and restricted by defined limits.  The 
violence it uses has to be hidden away or called something else because it presents a problem 
in the rationality of biopolitics, the explicit aim of which is the optimisation and enhancement 
of life.  The connection with violence has to be mediated: biopolitical violence must pass 
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through the regime of knowledge/power and it must be given a scientific legitimacy that is 
compatible with the aims of biopolitics.  
In arguing that Foucault does not analyse the politics of the great totalitarian states, 
Agamben overlooks his last lecture in the series Society Must be Defended, in which he referred 
to the phenomenon of State racism in Nazi Germany as an example of the paradoxes in the 
exercise of modern biopower.  He anticipated Agamben’s argument by acknowledging that 
Nazi Germany could be seen in many ways as the extreme development of biopower: there 
was no other state in which ‚the biological was so tightly, so insistently, regulated.‛55  How-
ever, he posed the question of how a political system so completely centred upon biopower 
could unleash such murderous power and in fact utilise the old sovereign right to kill.  ‚How 
can power such as this kill, if it is true that its basic function is to improve life, to prolong its 
duration, to improve its chances, to avoid accidents, and to compensate for failings?‛56 
His answer was biological racism, which provided a way of separating the different 
groups that exist within a population and then establishing a biological relationship between 
them.  This was not an adversarial relationship between enemies—the inferior group was not 
the enemy threatening the nation’s existence in the Schmittian sense.  It was rather a biological 
relationship of abnormality: the inferior group had to be eliminated as a biological threat to 
the population and its improvement.  The death of the inferior race would make life in general 
healthier.  The objective to improve life for its own sake could thus legitimise killing within 
the rationality of biopower.  The logic of biological racism was the condition that made killing 
acceptable in biopolitical societies.  
 
In the biopolitical system< killing, or the imperative to kill, is acceptable only if it results 
not in a victory over political adversaries, but in the elimination of the biological threat to 
and the improvement of the species or race< Once the State functions in the biopower 
mode, racism alone can justify the murderous function of the State.57 
 
It is thus highly significant that the racism of Nazi Germany was essentially different from 
‚ordinary‛ racism, which takes the form of mutual contempt or hatred between races.  The 
specificity of modern biopolitical racism is bound up with a technique of power that allows 
biopower to work.  When racism becomes the racism of a biopolitical state, ‚it is obliged to use 
race, the elimination of races and the purification of the race, to exercise sovereign power.‛58  
In biopolitical societies, a sovereign power cannot simply assume unmediated power over 
bare life if it wants to kill its own citizens, but must pass through the regime of power/ 
knowledge and gain bioscientific legitimacy.  Biological racism provided a pseudo-scientific 
discourse that was compatible with biopower, and through which biopower could be trans-
formed into sovereign power.  
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The Third Reich thus became a monstrous combination of biopower and sovereign 
power, exercising sovereign means for biopolitical ends.  Genocide was carried out in the 
name of care and the improvement of life:  
 
We have, then, in Nazi society something that is quite extraordinary: this is a society which 
has generalized biopower in an absolute sense, but which has also generalized the sovereign 
right to kill.  The two mechanisms – the classic, archaic mechanism that gave the State the 
right the life and death over its citizens< and the new mechanism of biopower – coincide 
exactly.59 
 
Foucault thus agrees with Agamben that the tension between biopower and sovereign power 
was dissolved in the Third Reich and the two coincided exactly.  This coincidence was not ori-
ginary and necessary, however; it was historically contingent.  It was made possible because of 
two crucial factors.  Firstly, biological racism worked as the mechanism that harmonised the 
opposing rationalities of biopower and sovereign power, and masked the fact that a bio-
political society was killing its own people.  Secondly, the Third Reich was also a society in 
which the sovereign power to kill ran through its entire social body.  It was granted not only 
to the State, but also to a whole series of individuals, such as members of the SA and the SS:  
 
Ultimately everyone in the Nazi Sate had the power of life and death over his or her 
neighbours, if only because of the practice of informing, which effectively meant doing away 
with the people next door, or having them done away with.60 
 
It was sovereign power—not just biopower—that was taken to its extreme limit.  
For Foucault, the seamless coincidence of sovereign power and biopower in Nazi Ger-
many was thus a historically contingent conglomeration of factors, ‚the paroxysmal point‛ in 
the play between the sovereign right to kill and the mechanisms of biopower geared towards 
the protection and enhancement of life.61  The concentration camp was not the exemplary un-
masking of an originary connection between violence and political power in modernity, but ‚a 
demonic combination‛ of two fundamentally different rationalities of power: biopower and 
sovereign power.62  As Mika Ojakangas observes, Foucault considered these two forms of 
power to have become intermingled, modern states being the resulting combination.  This is 
not the case, however, because there are hidden de jure ties between sovereign power and bio-
power, as Agamben claims.  It is rather that sovereign states have de facto used bio-political 
methods, just as modern biopolitical societies have de facto hinged on principles of sove-
reignty.63 
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Conclusion: Biopolitical Violence 
Both Foucault and Agamben describe modern biopolitics as a political system that is charac-
terised by the indistinction of tactics and laws, norms and facts.  They both warn us that ‚in 
the biopolitical horizon that characterises modernity, the physician and the scientist move in 
the no-man’s-land into which at one point the sovereign alone could penetrate.‛64  However, 
they differ on their views on the grounds of modern biopower as well the possible forms of 
resistance against it due to their fundamentally different understandings of sovereignty. 
Foucault has a more historically and politically grounded conception of sovereignty 
than Agamben, but it is theoretically very rudimentary. He understands sovereign power es-
sentially as a repressive and coercive form of power, which operates through legal pro-
hibitions.  This narrow conception leads him to claim that sovereignty fails to account for the 
modern biopolitical techniques of power that function largely outside of the law.  We need an 
understanding of political power that can account for the way that sovereignty has incor-
porated elements that are productive of life: forms of power that administer and manage life 
outside the juridical realm.  Agamben, on the other hand, relies on a Schmittian understanding 
of sovereignty according to which sovereignty is irreducible to the law because it must form 
its constitutive condition: it can issue policies that are nothing other than politically driven 
sovereign decisions.  Therefore, it is exactly sovereignty that must account for those modern 
biopolitical mechanisms that fall through the grid of the juridical realm.  
Agamben’s account can be understood as a re-conceptualization of sovereignty, which 
Andreas Kakyvas has aptly called ‚bio-sovereignty.‛65  Bio-sovereignty does not simply exer-
cise external control over its subjects or limit itself to the juridical regulation of social relations.  
Its powers are not confined to mere repression and coercion, and it does not rule solely 
through legal prohibitions.  It is capable of producing, administering, and managing life itself, 
and ultimately deciding on its value or nonvalue.  However, by assimilating all power rela-
tions and political rationalities to this comprehensive, ahistorical and ontologised notion of 
sovereignty, Agamben’s account makes it very difficult to imagine forms of resistance.  He 
does not offer us tools for the analysis of the theoretical tensions, political struggles and 
historical transformations that have characterised sovereignty in modernity.  
In Foucault’s framework, biopower and sovereign power cannot be assimilated into 
one comprehensive power formation such as bio-sovereignty.  Biopower is opposed to sove-
reign power not only in terms of its productive aims and rationality, but also in the sense that 
it is essentially not the power of a democratically elected sovereign body.  It is typically the 
power of experts: managers and administrators of life.  This opposition is important in terms 
of imagining possible forms of resistance against biopolitical violence.  Rather than attempting 
to eradicate sovereignty, we are left with the option of trying to break apart bio-sovereignty—
a form of sovereignty in which biopower and sovereign power coincide seamlessly—and 
strengthening the power of popular sovereignty.  His analysis thus leaves open the possibility 
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that a viable way to resist biopolitical violence would be to reinstall legal protections and de-
mocratic mechanisms of accountability rather than launch a wholesale critique of sovereignty 
aiming at its eradication.  
There is no originary sovereign violence for Foucault because state-violence must al-
ways be understood as a set of specific practices connected with a historical power formation.  
However, the rise of biopower in modernity means that the sites for practices of state-violence 
unregulated by juridical mechanisms have potentially increased.  Biopolitical practices of vio-
lence are typically grounded on effective policy, professional management and expert know-
ledge, or legitimised through the deployment of the law as an administrative tactic.  They are 
practices of violence that are not strictly illegal, but they are extra-legal.66  
Hence, even if we do not accept Agamben’s analysis that we are living in a permanent 
state of exception wholesale, the fact that techniques of biopower often fall outside, or through 
the grid of politically accountable sovereign power, implies that they can, for this very reason, 
easily revert to exceptional sovereign power in the Schmittian sense: biopower can become 
sovereign power in a state of exception uncontrolled and unregulated by any law.  The bio-
political practices of violence are often hidden within various institutions in which petty 
sovereigns can reign, uncontrolled by parliamentary or judicial restrictions.  Hence, even if we 
deny any de jure connection between biopower and sovereign power, we have to be mindful 
that the growing importance of the former in modernity means that the hidden sites for 
exceptional sovereign violence—violence that is direct, unregulated and arbitrary—have 
therefore also multiplied.  Although Agamben’s analysis of the originary intersection between 
sovereign power and biopower is thus inconsistent with Foucault’s understanding of 
biopolitics to the extent that it ontologizes the biopolitical violence of the 20th century, it 
should nevertheless be credited as a stark and radical exposure of the dangers of biopower.  
The modern dominance of this distinct rationality of power centred on the care and protection 
of life has opened up sites for unprecedented forms of violence. 
It is thus my contention that if we want to understand the specific forms that political 
violence takes in modernity, we need a careful analysis of the points of tension, as well as the 
points of coincidence, between sovereign power and biopower.  By such an analysis, Foucault 
exposes a form of power that does not threaten us with violence, but is nevertheless an effec-
tive way of controlling and directing people’s lives.  The effectiveness of biopower lies pre-
cisely in the fact that it explicitly refrains from killing and instead grounds its demands on 
scientific truth and the goals of wellbeing and care of the population.  Without an under-
standing of the rationality of biopower it would be difficult to explain how we willingly par-
take in the profound and violent disciplining and medicalisation of our lives that characterises 
modern societies and their specific forms of biopolitical violence.  Because violence is the in-
verse logic of biopower, biopolitical violence is in some ways even more dangerous than 
sovereign violence because it is harder to detect and to regulate.  
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To conclude, Foucault would agree with Arendt that what characterises modernity is 
that we have become ants.  He contends, however, that the reason we have become ants is not 
that we mistakenly comprehend our biological life in political terms.  We become ants pre-
cisely at the moment when we are no longer able to pose questions concerning our biological 
life in political terms.  Political power in biopolitical societies has evaporated and has been 
replaced by purely administrative and economic power.  Complex biopolitical techniques aim 
at making our life as long and happy as possible with the most scientifically advanced means 
available.  There are no political decisions or debates left when the aims of biopower are 
unanimous and its means scientific.  The crisis of politics in modernity cannot be resolved by 
depoliticising biological life in the sense of returning it to the private sphere.  On the contrary, 
it must be explicitly politicised by dispelling its naturalness and revealing its historically 
specific connections with the biopolitical regime of power/knowledge. 
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